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ATC CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN
THE EN-ROUTE FLIGHT REGIME
by
INTRODUCTION
E. Gene Lyman*
SUMMARY
Air traffic control operations were examined to learn what factors of
controller performance should be given consideration in the design and
development of future automation systems enhancing ATC. ASRS reports, the
source material for the study, were selected from relatively current (within
one year of present) groupings of contingency or unusual operations affecting
controllers in Centers.
Analysis of the final study data set reports indicated that the
retrieved reports appeared to be reasonably representative of operations in
Centers. Contingencies were of two types: those constraining airspace usage
or traffic flow (i.e., weather) and those related to system and equipment
usage (i.e., radar /radio status). Examination of controller response to con-
tingencies and workload pressures showed differing effects on controller
allocations of effort among the three primary functions of planning,'monitor-
ing, and information transfer. It appears that automation advancements
oriented towards aiding the controller in performing monitoring tasks may
I_
	
offer the most substantial safety benefit.
The Federal Aviation Administration ( FAA) has underway major programs to
improve the safety, efficiency, and productivity of the future National
*Research Consultant, Battelle Columbus Laboratories' ASRS Office.M
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Airspace System. The more significant of these are the Discrete Address Bea-
con System (DABS) that will permit direct, digital communication between
ground and aircraft; the Automatic Traffic Advisory and Resolution Service
(ATARS), an independent, ground based, collision avoidance system compatible
with DABS; and Automated En-route ATC (AERA).
One justification for DABS is that digital communication between the
ground and air will be more timely and less subject to ambiguity and
misunderstanding. Also, aircrew would have available for reference hard copy
of the controller's complete clearance. Studies of aircrew performance(1)
indicate that substantial safety benefits may be realized by DABS usage.
ATARS and AERA are justified on the basis of safety and productivity. Signi-
ficant unanswered questions exist regarding their usage and the role of the
air traffic controller in an automated ATC environment.
The study reported here examines air traffic control operations for the
purpose of ascertaining what benefits and what liabilities, based on con-
troller performance, should be given consideration in the design and develop-
ment of future automation systems like those mentioned above. Source
material for the study was drawn from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting Sys-
tem (ASRS).
APPROACH
Since AERA specifically and ATARS more generally are associated with
en-route ATC, a search of the NASA ASRS data base was conducted to yield
safety reports pertaining to en-route ATC operations. The NASA ASKS is a
voluntary, confidential safety reporting program available to pilots, con-
trollers, and others using the National aviation system. Safety reports sub-
mitted to ASRS are analyzed, coded, and entered into a computer data base.
Based on the use of appropriate descriptors, keywords, etc., safety reports
may be retrieved for further research and analysis of specific subjects.
Complete descriptions of ASRS have been reported elsewhere(2+ 3).
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Safety repor.:s used in this study, were selected on the basis of satis-
[ fying the following criteria: (1) the report was submitted to ASRS by a zon-
troller within the previous year, and (2) a contingency or unusual operation
of some form was involved or conflict alert was activated. The purpose in
selecting only controller reports, as opposed to flight crew or other, was to
assure a description of ATC operations from the controller's perspective.
The condition that safety reports be submitted within the previous year was
I_ to minimize the influence, if any, of system or procedural factors that might
be found in the ASRS data base (extending back to 1976) that are no longer
significant. Contingency operations for the purpose of this study were
defined as situations over whi p-t :he controller has limited control or which
might require off-nominal cc:.^.rol tactics. In consultation with ASRS staff
specialists in ATC operations the contingency factors of weather, equipment
limitations or outages, special routings, and special use airspace were
selected as descriptors to conduct the data base search.
This study is not concerned with whether or not a system error or system
deviation occurred nor whether a situation in which less than standard
separation existed. However if a reporter noted that: conflict alert was
ativated, that report was selected for study in the event that contingencies
of a form not otherwise anticipated were revealed.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Database Search and Preliminary Analysis
Using the descriptors mentioned in the previous section, 241 individual
safety reports were obtained for study. The reports covered the period
August, 1979 through July, 1980. They were all submitted by controllers from
Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC). The reports were examined to
identify instances of multiple reports of the same incident or occurrence.
This examination revealed that 159 unique occurrences were reported.
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Eleven of the occurrences related to operations at the Anchorage ARTCC
and one to the Honolulu ARTCC. As these Center's extensive use of non-radar
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separation is atypical of the Center operations in the 48 contiguous States,
they were excluded from the study. As future automation efforts are related
to radar environments, an analysis of non-radar procedures was incompatible
with the purpose of this study.
The distribution of the remaining 147 occurrences by ARTCC is shown in
Table 1. Also shown is the total activity by Center for October, 1977
through September, 1978(4) . A regression analysis of these data yielded a
correlation coefficient of 0.478. This is significant (probability less than
0.05) suggesting to some degree a consistent relationship between total ARTCC
activity and occurrences reported to ASRS.
A recent study of the FAA System Effectiveness Information System (SETS)
by Kinney, Spahn, and Amato( 5) provides information about the number of sys-
tem errors occurring over the period 1974-1976. In Table 2 the distribution
of system errors at Centers by FAA Region is presented in relation to the
occurrences used in this study.
A regression analysis performed on the data shown in Table 2 produced a
correlation coefficient of 0.914. This is highly significant (probability
less than 0.001). Even though this study was designed without consideration
of its representativeness to the ARTCC environment, the significant relation-
ships between total aircraft handled and system errors are remarkable. The
occurrences used here should be viewed as substantively relating to ARTCC
opera ions.
The preliminary analysis also revealed that in 12 instances insufficient
information was provided in the safety report to permit complete analysis.
Accordingly, 135 occurrences formed the basis for the remainder of the study.
Each of these occurrences was examined in detail to identify the contingency
and other factors involved.
Contingency Factors
The contingency factors identified as having some bearing on the
reported occurrences fell into two broad categories. One category related to
4
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TABLE 1. ARTCC OPERATIONS AND REPORTED OCCURRENCES
Center Operations(a) Occurrences
Albuquerque 1,010,587 2
Atlanta 1 ,610,664 9
Boston 1,001,332 8
Chicago 1 ,982,189 7
Cleveland 1,879,024 12
Denver 923,701 10
Fort Worth 1,515,512 6
Houston 1,441,309 5
Indianapolis 1,517,993 12
Jacksonville 1,397,517 5
Kansas City 1,339,487 5
Los Angeles 1,389,269 13
Memphis 1,347,510 2
Miami 1,337,430 3
Minneapolis 1,241,627 6
New York 1,770,007 17
Oakland 1,120,442 12
Salt Lake City 656,746 2
Seattle 913,270 1
Washington, DC 1,557,139 10
a — Total Aircraft Handled
airspace and traffic flow constraints and the other related to system or
equipment functions. Table 3 presents the contingency factor distribution by
these two categories. Note that more than one factor could be cited in an
occurrence or that none may be relevant.
	 Of the 135 occurrences, 94
reflected the presence of a contingency situation that affected
	 the
controller ' s actions in some way.
of
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TABLE 2. SYSTEM ERRORS AND REPORTED OCCURRENCES
y t^
Region
System
Errors (a)
Reported
Occurrences
Central 16 S
Eastern 93 27
Great Lakes 161 37
New England 14 8
Northwest 11 1
Rock Mountain 28 12
Southern 125 19
Southwest 70 13
Western 91 25
a - Total for 1974-1976.
To illustrate the form of the above contingency factors in ARTCC opera-
tions a series of safety reports follow. The first involves controller error
leading to Radar Data Processing (RDP) function and Special Use Airspace con-
tingencies.
"Com A was on an IFR flt plan ORL-CTY-MSY-DWH at FL180.
I was working R30, Nepta Sector. All warning areas were
inactive. I cut off the key that displayed the lines for
the warning areas. At approx 21XXZ (17XX lcl) VPS apch
called and wanted to know who was in his airspace, they
did have a computer strip. When I cut off the special use
key for the warning areas it also cut off some of VPS
apch airspace to the south. I fell into my own trap by
cutting off the key and not remembering the VPS apch cntl
airspace extended further south than now displayed."
The following occurrence in which conflict alert was activated involves
xr	
distractions associated with uncertainty about broadband /na rrowband status
and weather.
6
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TABLE 3. CONTINGENCY FACTORS
Category Citations
Airspace and traffic flow factors 62
Weather deviations 29
Weather :4
Special use airspace 16
Routi::gs 13
Sector boundaries/status 4
System and equipment factors 48
Narrowband /broadband operation 8
Broadband operation 7
RDP functions 12
Communication functions 12
Aircraft system functions 4
Radar and radio coverage 2
"The data blocks on ACR Acft A and MLT Acft B started
flashing conflict alert. A was turned south and B was
turned south also. An attempt was made to stop A below B
at FL210. This was not accomplished. Weather conditions
involved a stationary cold front with up slope condi-
tions. Tops varied between 17,000 and FL240 in the area.
There were approximately 6 small aircraft on frequency.
Some were experiencing icing conditions. The computer
failed and recovered three times. We were not told
whether to go broadband or stay narrowband. The inter-
phase controller was distracted with change of route
information and the necessity of making and taking of
manual handoffs. The radar controller was trying to work
a broadband and a narrowband situation at the same time."
The final example to illustrate contingency operations demonstrates a
controller ' s problem when flight deviations due to weather and communication
failure occur.
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"While working heavy traffic: when there were extremely
turbulent thunderstorms in the sector, I had ACR A on a
vector heading of 060 degrees so that the flight might go
around an area of severe turbulence. The aircraft
requested FL330 and I issued climb instructions to them.
At the same time the sector immediately north of DET lei
handed off ACR B to me on an approximate heading of 180
degrees, this placed the two aircraft in a potential con-
flicting situation. After a period of about 10 seconds
when the B had not called on my frequency, I asked the
handoff man to get the transferring controller to switch
the aircraft, they replied that B was NORDO. I therefore
Issued an immediate turn to A of 70 degrees, which placed
his on vector heading of 350 degrees. I explained the
situation to the A and he concurred. At this time the
aircraft were approximately 12 O'Clock to each other and
about 3 mileo apart and A was FL334 and climbing."
Sector/Facility Boundaries
While examining the safety reports to determine the nature of the con-
tingency factor and how it may affect controller performance, it was observed
that many appeared to relate to situations occuring near the boundaries
between air traffic control sectors or fFcilities. Table 4 presents the dis-
tribution of occurrences as to their position relative to sector/facility
boundary and by the presence or absence of a contingency factor.
TABLE 4. DISTRIBUTION OF OCCURRENCES WITHIN SECTOR AIRSPACE
Occurrence
Location
Contingency Factor Present
Total PercentYes No
At sector boundary
Within sector
43
38
28
26
71
64
:3
47
A statistical test of the mutually independent sets shown in Table 4
reveals that no significant difference is found as a consequence of the Ares-
/	 ence of a contingency factor. The dominance of occurrences involving con-
/
8
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tingency factors was expected as the study was designed to yield that kind of
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occurrence. That 53 percent of the occurrences were situated geometrically
near sector/facility boundaries was unexpected. ASRS safety report analysis
1 and coding prior to computer entry establishes the presence of factors that
either appear to enable or are associated with the reported occurrence.
Returning to the original set of 241 safety reports comprising the data set
used in this study as a point of reference, one finds that some 226 directly
cited an ARTCC control enabling factor. Of these, there were only 55 nota-
tions ( 24.3 percent) suggesting between-sector /facility coordination issues.
A proportional analysis of the 135 study occurrences would have yielded only
33 boundary related occurrences, not the 71 actually found.
One further opportunity to compare the unexpectedly large proportion of
control problems found at the proximity of sector boundaries exists from the
study by Kinney, Spahn, and Amato (5) . In examining the FAA SEIS data base
they found that 23.8 percent of the ARTCC system errors occurring during
1974-1976 involved intersector or interfacility coordination issues.
Air Traffic Control at Sector Boundaries
No immediate explanation for the observed discrepancy being available,
further analysis concentrated on those occurrences taking place near sector
boundaries. As the principal procedural mechanisms for handling aircraft
movement transact-ions within the region of sector boundaries are handoffs and
point outs, the 71 occurrences were examined to assess the character of these
transactions. There were 39 in which either ^ •.he handoff o; point out was
late or omitted, 30 in which the handoff or point out transaction was per-
formed in accord with procedure, and 2 in which several sectors failed
sequentially to detect that an aircraft was operating at variance with the
posted flight plan.
The 39 incidents in which either the handoff or point out was omitted
represented about 29 percent of the 135 occurrences comprising the total
study set. This value is close to both ASKS and SEIS database proportions
relating to sector / facility coordination. The following example illustrates
i the consequences of an omitted point out.
9
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"I observed a target Acft A. entering O'Hare Tracon's
airspace 45 miles south of the airport. The canter con-
troller did not point out A. I put an ARTS tag on the
	
J
target and pointed his out to all controllers wcessary.
At that time, we did not know if the aircraft was vn or
IYR. My coordination was not in time for the south
departure man at O'Hare Tracon. Acft B came less than 3
miles and 1000 of the unknown traffic 42 miles south of
O'Hare, at 11 9000 ft MSL. B did not see the other
traffic."
The next example reveals, further, the controller's problems when a han-
doff transaction is late.
"ACR A was eastbound on J76 approx 40 west of ZUN at
FL330. ACR B was Mad from PHX to CUP. ZAB sector 39
effected a handoff approx 5 to 10 miles frem my boundary
on B. At approx the same time I received a handoff from
sector 92 on A. both acft were observed by as to be on
collision courses and were approx 10 to 15 miles apart.
After 2 attempts, I was able to issue and receive ack-
nowledgement for A to turn right. heading 120 vectors for
traffic. I then had to call sector 39 and have the con-
troller send B to my frequency. After B came over. I
turned him 30 deg to the right. Both acft passed each
other with approx 3 miles separation. I believe the
major factor leading to and causing this situation was
the failure of bath sectors 92 and 39 to effect a timely
radar handoff and transfer of communications."
The essential features of these two examples, and others where point
outs or handoffs are not performed in ac.^.ord with procedure. are the same.
The receiving controller has control over, at most, one of the aircraft, and
limited time, if any, to effect a solution to an impending conflict.
The 30 incidents occurring near sector boundaries where appropriate han-
doff or point out procedures were used present a substantially more complex
picture. The ►.formal handoff, or point out, may take one of three forms.
i.e., (1) approved as proposed, (2) approved with constraints reference other
traffic. or (3) denied. or "unable" (6) . The latter case (there were seven in
the subset) may present particular problems to the controller if he is
already managing a complex traffic flow situation. The following example
reveals how a controller's options .ire limited when faced with an "unable"
and other factors.
10
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ACRs-A and B enroute to JFK at FL330. B was north of J70
deviating due to a line of thunderstorms which extended
from Dunkirk. NY south to Tidtoute, PA. ACR -A was on J70
50 miles east of Jamestown, NY, VOR. B had just cleared
the east side of the thunderstorm area, and was assigned
a 150 deg heading to intercept J70 which would have put B
20 miles ahead of Acft A. At this time I made a computer
handoff to NY sector No. 49 on both aircraft, as well as
getting on the hotline to advise NY center of B's head-
ing. NY answered the line by telling me to give B a
right 360 deg turn, I then asked about ACR-A and NY
advised descend !1CR-A to FL290 and keep him coming. At
this time my options were few. Due to thunderstorm
activity I had traffic (C) at FL330 deviating north of
J584 which put the aircraft about 15 miles south of ACR-
A. I didn ' t want to turn A aroand and drive him back
into the weather, so I descended ACR-A to FL290 and with
B making a right 360 deg turn the two aircraft passed
within a mile and 1000 ft of each other where 5 miles and
2000 ft are required. This situation arises quite often
with NY when thunderstorms are in the area. My question
Is why must NY always wait until aircraft are almost on
the center boundaries before deciding if they can accept
an aircraft. If I would have had more of a warning this
situation would not have occurred."
When considered as a whole, the 30 handoff /porint out occurrences
revealed a wide range of associated factors as shown in Table 5.
The first two categories relate directly to the contingency factors
selected at the initiation of the study. The third category points up a
class of contingencies effected by the way pilots control their aircraft and
interact with the ATC system. The last c4 ►egory refers to these controller
human factors affecting ATC . As these factors were prevalent hero, and as
there were 64 incidents occurring wholly within a sector ' s boundaries, a more
detailed anal ysis of controller performance is presented in the following
sections.
Controller Performance
As previously shown. some 64 occurrences described incidents taking
place strictly within the confines of a controller ' s airspace. Even though
the selection of these for inclusion in this study was based on the presence
11
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TABLE S. FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH AANDOFF/POINTOUT OCCURRENCES
Airspace and Traffic Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . 16	 i
(Includes weather, special
	 (.
use airspace, navaid status,
sector geometry)
Equipment Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
(Includes radio, radar,
and radar data processing)
Pilot Performances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
(Includes aircraft performance,
clearance deviations, and
pilot discretion)
Controller Performance 	 26
(Includes coordination
deviations, planning,
monitoring, training, etc.)
of contingency factors, their analysis for the purpose of developing a quali -
tative description of controller performance appears warranted.
	
The approach taken was to analyze the occurrences from the perspective
	
!
of the controller's job responsibilities. That is, the controller is respon-
sible for planning the traffic flow 3n his sector and issuing clearances as
necessary to assure separation; and he is responsible for monitoring traffic
flow for assuring compliance with clearances and for detecting potential con-
flicts. In addition, the occurrences were analyzed to detect incidences of
information transfer deficiencies since the controller is essentially unable
to plan and monitor traffic movement if he has no knowledge of its presence.
Finally, the occurences were examined to identify the kinds and frequency of
discrete technical errors, e.g., computer entry errors, clearance delivery
errors, etc.
The results of the above described analyses are presented in Tables 6
and 7.
As shown in Table 7, controller technical errors were infrequently
reported.	 Consequently, other than to indicate the kinds that are present,
12
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TABLE 6. CONTROLLER PERFORMANCE DEFICIENCIES
^F
r'
Planning 27 42
Traffic flow (long term)
	 (11)
Conflict resolution
(short term)
	 (16)
Monitoring 22 35
Vigilance	 (18)
Distractions
	 (4)
Information Transfer 8 12
Unclassifiable 7 11
Totals 64
TABLE 7. CONTROLLER TECHNICAL ERRORS
Type	 Citation
Clearance Delivery
	 2
Strip Bay Usage
	 2
Computer Usage
	 3
Clearance Confirmation	 4
Briefing of Relief
	 2
no further effort to assess their influence on controller performance was
made in this study. A study of technical errors may be revealing, in its own
right, to identify areas of procedural or equipment usage deficiencies.
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Returning to Table 6, one observes that 42 percent involved planning
deficiencies, 35 percent monitoring deficiencies, 12 percent information
transfer deficiencies, and 11 percent could not be classified. The FAA sys-
tem errors review process leads to the determination of a principal direct
cause of a system error (5) . The most frequently cited causal factors are
failures in attention, judgement, and communication. Assuming that judgement
corresponds to planning, attention to monitoring, and communication to infor-
mation transfer, a statistical test was performed to assess the relationship
of the classification categories used here and the FAA categories. No sta-
tistically significant difference was observed, adding further support to the
r
earlier observation that these occurrences appear substantively representa-
tive of ARTCC operations.
The eight information transfer occurrences noted in Table 6 involved
failures among the controllers staffing a sector to make one another aware of
all the traffic under the jurisdiction of the sector. Usually the error
entailed the acceptance of a handoff by one controller without informing the
other.
The 22 occurrences involving monitoring deficiencies are straightforward
as to interpretation. Some involved the presence of distractions, such as
discussions with the controller's supervisor or a trainee; in others the con-
troller failed to maintain a complete awareness of the traffic flow in his
sector. Later in this section a hypothesis relating to monitoring deficien-
cies will be put forth.
The most prevalent form of controller performance deficiency pertained
to planning. It was observed that planning, or the strategies the controller
adopts to manage traffic flow, took two forms. The first involved the ini-
tial consideration of an aircraft's subsequent movement through the sector
airspace and the second involved traffic management in connection with
resolving potential conflicts. The following examples illustrate respec-
tively deficiencies in these two types of planning.
"ACR-A was southwest bound climbing out of Omaha, NE Air-
port direct HLC VOR.	 ACR-B was descending to Land at
f	 Omaha Airport routing LNK direct OMA VOR. The traffic at
14
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the LNK sector was moderate with at least three other
aircraft possible traffic for A and B. I planned for B
to pass north of A, but they became head on traffic. The
collision alert started to flash, but there wasn't enough
time to react to it. I turned both aircraft 90 degrees
left, but A ended up topping the B instead of lateral
separation."
"I relieved A ctlr to go home about 2:30 p.m. The brief-
ing included the potential confliction. The ACR B was
about 25nm N of LOZ crossing J43 direct DAS. ACR A was
on J42, both Wbnd. In this situation with ACR B being
25-40 kts faster the longer you wait to vector ACR A
north behind ACR B the easier it is. I waited until
about 3 min before conflict would occur and turned ACR A
15 deg right, after about 1 min I saw the vector was
Inadequate and turned him an additional 25 or 30 deg.
ACR A asked where his tfc was, I stated 2:00 and 12 mi,
ACR B. The ACR A said I don't think I want to get this
close can we have a higher alt? I cl yd ACR A to FL370
and then issued hdg 270 to ACR B (about 30 deg rt). The
action was too little and too late. The aircraft passed
between 1 and 2 mi apart with 800' alt. The error was a
result of poor or untimely actions on my part."
During examination of the ASRS reports associated with this analysis of
controller performance, it was observed that in many instances the reporter
would describe the amount of traffic under his control. That is, he would
indicate the traffic flow was moderate, moderate to heavy, heavy, or complex.
On the assumption that the controller was conveying workload level, the deci-
sion was made to examine the controller performance factors in the presence
of higher workload levels and also to examine the same factors in the pres-
ence of contingencies. A statistical test was first performed to test the
hypothesis that workload would be mentioned if a contingency factor was
present.	 The results of this analysis, shown in Table 8 refute the
hypothesis although marginally.
The distribution of the controller performance factors in the presence
of heavy workload is shown in Table 9. No significant differences are
observed as a consequence of workload reported levels.
fe
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V.	 TABLE 8. WORKLOAD AND CONTINGENCY FACTORS
Workload
Cited
Cont!nLency Factor Present
Yes No
Yes
No
19
19
7
19
X2 - 3.408	 .05 < p < .1
TABLE 9. WORKLOAD AND CONTROLLER PERFORMANCE
Workload
Cited
Controller Performance Factor
Planning Monitoring Inf. Transfer
Yes
No
10
17
12
10
3
5
X2 = 1.66, not significant
In Table 10, the distribution of controller performance factors as a
function of contingency factors is shown. A very significant difference in
controller performance is found as a consequence of the presence of a con-
tingency.
The finding that contingency factors significantly :influence controller
performance, and workload does not, adds credence to the previous observation
(Table 8) that workload and contingency factors are independent considera-
tions as to their effect on controller performance.
16
TABLE 10. CONTINGENCY FACTORS AND CONTROLLER PERFORMANCE
i
is
r.
i
r
Contingency
Factor
Present
Controller Performance Factor
Planning Monitoring Inf. Transfer
Yes 10 16 7
No 17 6 1
X2 - 8.53m p < .02
Although the information presented in ASRS safety reports cannot in
itself offer an explanation for the differences shown in Table 10, considera-
tion of the controller's perception of himself might offer some insight. A
recent study by Rose, Jenkins, and Hurst (7) indicates that as a group con-
trollers tend towards strong, dominant, agressive, independent, self-
confident personalities.
These personality traits suggest that controllers would prefer active,
planning-related functions as opposed to passive, monitoring-related func-
tions. Further, these trait related preferences are reinforced by virtue of
the large number of aircraft to be handled as opposed to the very infrequent
number of system errors.
A review of the findings presented above in light of the controller's
personality traits appears warranted. First, that planning related errors
occur more frequently can prcbably be explained on the basis that the con-
troller does more planning than monitoring. This notion might also be
expressed as, "If I plan well, why monitor?" Second, that planning errors
occur relatively less frequently when contingency or higher workload condi-
tions prevail probably suggests that the controller is putting forth greater
effort to plan well than he does under nominal conditions.
17
The disproportionate number of monitoring errors occurring under con-
tingency conditions suggests that more effort may be required to plan effec-
tively than is appreciated. The planning effort may, under certain cir-
cumstances, be so compelling as to be a distraction intervening in the accom-
plishment of other duties.
Implications for ATC Automation
A recent literature review by Smith and Dieterly (8) reveals that few
proven guidelines exist for the introduction and use of automation based on
human performance considerations. They further report that as yet the techn-
ical community has not reached agreement about a definition of automation.
Without other reference then, the material developed and presented in
the preceeding sections must be considered within the context of the FAA's
Institutional responsibilities. The FAA must provide for the safe, orderly
and efficient flow of air traffic. Automation concepts that are at variance
with a controller's abilities might be expected to be counterproductive to
FAA expectations.
Current automation efforts relating to enhanced information transfer
between aircraft and ATC, e.g., DABS, appear in light of the material
developed in this study not to be at variance with a controller's performance
abilities. There is however apparently a safety problem relating to informa-
tion transfer between control sectors that is not being addressed in any
known program.
The AERA program, recently described by Zellweger and Weathers(9),
appears to be oriented towards automation of the planning and control func-
tions of air traffic control. Although the information developed here indi-
cates that planning errors are more frequent, that circumstance is influenced
Inversely as a consequence of special demands on the controller's planning
abilities. The early adoption of automation techniques that directly assume
a portion of the planning responsib i lities might be received negatively by
the controller.
18
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Zellweger and Weathers point out that attainment of completely automated
rplanning and control would be realized only through an evolutionary process.
Automatic aids for assistance in resolving short-term, potential conflict
situations--the planning deficiency most frequently observed here--would
appear to have direct safety benefits as well as to introduce planning
t'	
oriented automation to the controller. 	 j
Automation to aid the controller in traffic monitoring would also appear
to provide safety benefits as well as be readily accepted by the controller.
That is, of the 135 occurrences in this study, the controller reporter noted
that conflict alert was activated in 31 instances. In no instances did
reporters indicate, or suggest, a negative attitude about conflict alert or
Its activation. There was, to the contrary, one suggestion that it might be
improved for head-on traffic situations.
Several areas of deficiencies observed in this study might benefit from
the use of automatic monitoring aids. One would detect aircraft deviations
from flight plans or clearances. Another would detect potential omissions of
handoffs or pointouts and cue controllers--remind thew--of the need to take
action.
As there are no known published reports describing the details of the
ATARS concept, the information developed in this study can be used in only a
general way to consider independent conflict resolution systems. The discus-
sion proceeds on the assumption that the conflict resolution message results
In an uncoordinated movement of air traffic.
The class of ARTCC control problems described here that relate directly
to uncoordinated traffic movement involves those incidents occurring near
sector boundaries where the pointout or handoff was omitted or late. The
observation was made with respect to them that the controller had little time
to resolve potential conflicts. If the independent resolution messages are
extremely rare events, they may prove to be a significant safety factor. If,
on the other hand, they occur too frequently, independent conflict resolution
systems may be discounted by both controllers and pilots.
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
An ASRS study of ARTCC air traffic control operations was conducted to
1	
ascertain what benefits and what liabilities based on controller performance
should be given consideration in the development of further automation for
t
use in the en—route air traffic environment.
The occurrences selected for study were found to correlate significantly
with the frequency and geographic distribution of total aircraft handled and
system errors. When classified into controller performance deficiency
categories of planning, monitoring, and information transfer, the occurrences
were found to correspond with FAA system error causal factor categories of
judgement, attention, and communication.
The study was designed to assess the specific effects of contingencies
on controller performance. Contingencies found to be a factor include those
that constrain airspace usage or traffic flow such as weather and special use
airspace and those related to system and equipment usage such as radar and
radio communication status.
The occurrences were found frequently to describe situations occurring
within the proximity of control sector boundaries. The most frequently
observed situations involved omitted, late, or denied handoffs or pointouts.
Controller performance deficiencies were found to be related to failures in
planning, monitoring and information transfer.
The presence of a contingency factor was found to affect significantly
the distribution of planning, monitoring, and information transfer failures.
It was found that workload, based on reported traffic levels, did not signi-
ficantly affect the distribution of performance failures.
Based on these findings, the following conclusions were reached:
I. The occurrences reported to ASRS and used in this study
relate substantively to ARTCC operations and system
errors.
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2. Omitted, late, and denied handoffs and pointouts occur
relatively frequently and efforts to reduce their
occurrence would offer significant safety benefits.
3. Managing contingency situations has an important effect
on controller performance adversely influencing his abil-
ity to monitor and transfer information.
4. Automation oriented towards aiding the controller in per-
,	 formance of his monitoring tasks would offer substantial
safety benefits.
I
` 5. Independent conflict resolution systems that are not
coordinated with the controller's traffic management
tasks are not likely to be acceptable.
C
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